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Preface 
This thesis is the final product of my MA ‘International Relations: International Studies’ at Leiden 
University. To my friends, family and fellow students it was no surprise that I wanted to write it 
about Kosovo. Pristina became my home during a six-month internship at the Embassy of 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, frequent visits, and the month I committed to the interviews. I fell in 
love with the people, culture and nature Kosovo has to offer. It was therefore even more bitter to 
see Kosovo struggle with the implications of its past. While many aspects of governance clearly 
did not function as desired, I was eager to discover the processes which hampered improvement. 
This was especially the case for urban development, which is a main subject of my studies in Delft. 
Pristina is a concrete city where it seems easier to build a skyscraper than to plant a flower. Its 
chaotic nature has its charm but at the end of the day hampers its economic development. My 
interest to explore how this came to be led me to research the influence of politics on spatial 
planning in Kosovo. 
I am grateful for all the help I received from those I interviewed. They did not only help me gain 
an in-depth understanding of the system, their frustration and passion provided me with great 
inspiration. Furthermore, I would like to thank Dr. Henk Kern for his guidance during my research. 
Finally, I would like to thank my friends, my parents, and my love for their support. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Governance in Kosovo and spatial planning 
The end of the Kosovo War in 1999 also brought an end to the inflexible social system of the 
Yugoslav regime previously in place (Narang & Reutersward, 2006). Serbia, of which Kosovo had 
been an autonomous region from 1945 onwards (Krieger, 2001), did not, however, accept an 
independent Kosovar state (Weller, 2008). In order to prevent reignition of the conflict, the United 
Nations Security Council’s Resolution 1244 (1999) transferred Kosovo’s governance to what 
would become the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), while 
leaving Kosovo’s status unresolved. As it took two years before UNMIK managed to create 
functional institutions, there was “virtual anarchy” (Narang & Reutersward, 2006, p.5) during the 
first phase of post-war reconstruction. Governance remained problematic after the creation of 
institutions as the lack of support of the public and elite prevented them from being embedded in 
Kosovar society (van Willigen, 2009). As a fragile democracy with contested status Kosovo still 
faces substantial governance issues such as rooted corruption, struggling institutions, a flawed rule 
of law system, and a weak economy (Gashi, 2017; Perrit, 2009). 
Kosovo’s failed state-building efforts are reflected in its physical reconstruction. Cities grew 
exponentially given the post-war need for housing and employment while the biggest growth 
occurred in the capital, Pristina1 (Vöckler, 2009). This urban development occurred uncontrolled 
given the initial absence of institutions, but even with governance structures in place it took years 
before a planning system started functioning (Ibid). This is problematic from a governance point 
of view because spatial planning is crucial for overcoming development issues and is especially 
required in post-conflict urbanization (Pathak, 2011). Furthermore, spatial planning embodies 
governance of territory (Koresawa & Konvitz, 2001) which, in the case of Kosovo, is politically 
contested given its unresolved status. While analyzing the functioning of public policy in Kosovo 
is already important for gaining insights on post-conflict state-building, research on its spatial 
planning as a part of governance becomes thus even more interesting given its facilitating role for 
economic development and Kosovo’s disputed status. 
                                                          
1 Pristina, the English name for the capital is used in this research (Prishtinë in Albanian and Priština in Serbian). 
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The following chapters discuss the process in which spatial planning developed in Kosovo and 
what the influence of international and local politics were on this development. International 
politics are considered given the international administration and geopolitical interests, such as 
Serbia’s claim on ownership of Kosovo. Local politics of governing parties are also included given 
the negative impact of Kosovar’s elite on the functioning of institutions. Furthermore, this 
approach allows for identifying the impact of international politics on local politics. The timeframe 
runs from the end of the war in 1999 up to the end of 2017 to capture not only the period of 
UNMIK’s governance, but also the functioning of institutions left in its wake. To operationalize 
governance, this research follows Fukuyama’s definition of it being “a governments’ ability to 
make and enforce rules, and to deliver services” (Fukuyama, 2013, p.3). It therefore focuses on 
the legislation regarding spatial planning and its implementation. The research question is 
formulated as: what was the influence of international and local politics on the functioning of 
spatial planning in Kosovo from 1999 to 2017? 
 
1.2 Literature review  
The knowledge gap which shapes this research originates from existing academic literature on 
governance in Kosovo and spatial planning which can be divided in different groups. First, 
scholars’ findings on governance characteristics in Kosovo are discussed with a focus on the 
UNMIK interim administration which ran from 1999 to 2008 and the challenges it faced. A 
separate paragraph is dedicated to one of the main determining factors which shaped public policy: 
decentralization given Serbian interests. Finally, before the implications of existing literature for 
this research are discussed, a detailed account is presented on the academic research on spatial 
planning in Kosovo. 
 
1.2.1 Governance in Kosovo 
There is a core body of academic literature on the functioning of governance in Kosovo in which 
two main causes can be found for the failure to provide sustainable governmental institutions: the 
double-faced responsibilities and interests of UNMIK, and the post-conflict characteristics of 
Kosovo with its unresolved status as most important element. Chesterman (2004) discusses the 
challenges of international administrations and specifically Kosovo, where he states that the 
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international community neglected local characteristics and needs. Knoll (2005) follows 
Chesterman, but specifies how the double responsibility and interests of the UNMIK 
administration hampered its effectiveness: with Kosovo’s status unresolved in the background, 
UNMIK had to prove to the international community it could govern effectively within its mandate 
defined by Resolution 1244, while simultaneously protecting and governing over all of Kosovo’s 
citizens. This is where UNMIK’s governance effectiveness already inherently suffered from the 
balancing of diverse interests, which according to Joireman (2016) led to failure of institutions to 
implement legislation. The balancing of different interests led to a situation in which the elite 
defied official policy, which is a phenomenon explored by multiple scholars. Mulaj (2011) ties 
into Knoll’s statement of UNMIK’s double-faced legitimacy and uses privatization as an example, 
where the Albanian elite misused its position without proper control by the international 
administration. This phenomenon was already described in the ‘Lessons Learned Analysis Report 
of the European Stability Initiative (2002) and follows a trend of impunity for members of the 
Albanian elite associated with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) which according to Wolfgram 
(2008) already started at the end of the war in 1999. A more detailed account on the role of the 
Serbian elite’s defiance of Kosovar institutions is provided by Van der Borgh (2012) which he also 
attributes to UNMIK’s failure to account for Kosovar Serbian interests. Van Willigen (2009, 2012) 
provides a broader complementary image by discussing the lack of support of both Albanian and 
Serb masses and elite in Kosovo with regards to UNMIK’s attempt to create sustainable 
institutions. He states that the causes for these phenomena are the unresolved status of Kosovo and 
its frozen-conflict character: the violent conflict between Serbians and Albanians has ceased but 
there is still no compatibility between the two parties on the unresolved status. Harland (2010) 
adds to the understanding of the implications of Kosovo’s unresolved status on its governance by 
describing how decision-making became dependent on the international community while high-
level negotiations with Serbia failed to provide results. He also describes how the European Rule 
of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) was instigated in 2008 which would take over main tasks of 
UNMIK in assisting Kosovo’s institutions. EULEX mainly focuses on the judiciary system (The 
Council of the European Union, 2008) while functioning under the UNMIK umbrella rather than 
replacing it (Harland, 2010). This was deemed a step forward by the international community in 
the process of reaching autonomous governance in Kosovo and possible resolution on its status, 
but reality proved to be different. Serbian power started to domesticate more in Kosovo’s local 
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governance in municipalities with Serbian majority as it did not recognize Kosovo’s self-declared 
independence of February 2008. An example is the judiciary where a parallel Serbian system was 
put in place in the North (Ibid). Dahlman and Williams (2010) add to the insight of Serbian 
influence on governance in Kosovo by focusing on defiance politics towards Kosovo’s 
governmental institutions in Serbian enclaves which reflects the aforementioned narrative by Van 
der Borgh (2012). The loose grip of the central government on local governance, however, did not 
only come to be given on-the-ground defiance in the light of Kosovo’s unresolved status or frozen-
conflict setting, but was already embedded in the decentralized governance system set in place by 
UNMIK. 
 
1.2.2 Decentralization for conflict mitigation 
Zeqiri, Stephens and Zou (2010) provide a detailed account on how decentralization policy  came 
to be in the years after the war for political inclusion of Serbian minorities. Their statement that 
decentralization was put in place for conflict mitigation, but did not manage to provide desired 
results in easing tensions, is echoed by Rossi (2014), the International Crisis Group (2012) and 
Dahlman and Williams (2010). The authors agree that the main reason for its failure was the 
absence of a functioning central government, and Gjoni, Wetterberg and Dunbar (2010) even argue 
that decentralization proved counter effective for conflict mitigation as political segregation 
enhanced divisions. The academic literature on decentralization generally focuses on its role in 
conflict management, as the previous scholars illustrate, and there is relatively little information 
on the actual effectiveness and implications of local governance during and after international 
administration. Mustafa, Ahmeti and Fejza (2011) discuss the efficiency of municipalities to create 
their own revenue, while Agimi (2014) discusses local government reforms and the democratic 
character of decision making on a local level. Both pieces, however, merely analyze the system 
and provide recommendations for improving efficiency with a focus on bureaucracy and fiscal 
elements, rather than discussing the governance related benefits or issues which originated from 
decentralization. The actual functioning of local governance in Kosovo is thus still a relatively 
unexplored field even though it is a cornerstone of Kosovo’s decentralized public policy and 
deemed unsuccessful by multiple scholars. 
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The previous paragraphs explored the academic literature on governance in Kosovo in which the 
negative impact of UNMIK’s double-faced interests and legitimacy, as well as Kosovo’s post-
conflict setting clearly stand out. These two main causes led to governance in Kosovo being 
characterized by a decentralized system with weak institutions and a corrupt elite. What is missing, 
however, is a more precise account on the specific functioning of central and local governance in 
the light of post-conflict state-building rather than only in a conflict mitigation perspective. 
Research regarding a specific sector would provide new insights into the actual functioning of 
governance on a central and local level. Given Kosovo’s uncontrolled reconstruction and disputed 
status the research focuses on spatial planning. Furthermore, Narang and Reutersward (2006) 
already proclaimed the importance of spatial planning for sustainable public governance and 
development in Kosovo.  
 
1.2.3 Spatial planning in Kosovo 
Literature on spatial planning in Kosovo is generally scarce. The existing scholarly work does not 
focus on the implications of spatial planning for Kosovo’s governance. This is problematic since 
Kosovo faces substantial governance issues while spatial planning embodies the coordination of 
governance sectors within a certain territory (Koresawa & Konvitz, 2001). Garstka (2010) states 
that existing literature mainly focused on aesthetics of architecture rather than planning, but there 
was already some literature present. D’hondt (2006) discusses urbanization phenomena, such as 
informal settlements, and explains how the United Nations Human Settlement Programme (UN-
HABITAT), the main international organization involved in spatial planning, helped develop the 
spatial planning framework through its programs. Furthermore, a critical European Stability 
Initiative report (2002) criticized planning and governance failures in the capital Pristina, which it 
claimed was caused by UNMIK’s passive approach in controlling development, an overall 
discrepancy between spatial planning and reality, and unreliable municipal departments.  
Recent years provided more literature with diverging focus from the municipal to the national 
level. Boussauw (2012) discusses the effects of decentralization on the spatial planning system 
and considers the development of Peja/Pec on a municipal level2. For key issues faced in the spatial 
                                                          
2 Peja is the Albanian name, Pec the Serbian. 
12 
 
planning system, such as informal settlements and lack of obedience to planning documents, 
Boussauw mentions three main causes: the weak municipal administration compared to a strong 
real estate sector, lack of capacity and knowledge in the sector, and absence of social support for 
the system. Corruption is also mentioned as a general factor deriving from the “volatile political 
situation that is typical of a post-war period of stabilization” (Ibid, p.148), but the specific politics 
at play or its impact are not discussed. Furthermore, the research focuses on Peja/Pec, given the 
analysis of two international projects: UN-HABITAT’s Municipal Spatial Planning Support 
Programme (MuSPP) and MobKos3. It thus therefore does not focus on Pristina, which 
experienced the biggest uncontrolled growth, only because it didn’t take part in these two 
programs. Regarding literature on a national level there are two main articles providing insight 
into the functioning of specific institutions. Nushi (2011) gives an overview of the different 
organizations involved with spatial planning such as the Institute of Spatial Planning (ISP) and 
Department of Spatial Planning (DSP), which are the two national bodies dealing with spatial 
planning. He discusses their mandates while offering critical reflections on capacity issues and the 
lack of clear division regarding responsibilities given overlapping portfolios. Halimi (2014) 
analyzes the functioning of institutions dealing with property disputes in which he concludes the 
unwished results, being the lack of returnees, were not to be blamed on the institutions’ 
effectiveness on following their mandate, but “can be mainly attributed to the overall political 
environment” (Ibid, p.234). Just like Boussauw the research fails to discuss what this political 
environment exactly entails. A similar trend can be seen in more literature regarding issues in 
spatial planning or other relevant fields where the influence of politics is not touched upon4. 
Vöckler (2009), for instance, provides an extensive overview of the history and impact of 
uncontrolled growth in Pristina right after the war, but leaves the functioning of institutions rather 
                                                          
3 The MuSPP assisted multiple municipalities in the drafting of their municipal planning documents, while MobKos 
was a project on urban mobility for which Peja/Pec served as a pilot project (Boussauw, 2012). 
4 Cordial and Rosendhaug (2009) also focus on property restitution and relevant institutions, but from a legal and 
administrative perspective, not a political one. Gulan et al (2017) discuss the polluted ground in Pristina, but the 
content focuses on technical causes only. The aforementioned ESI report also does not discuss the influence of politics. 
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undiscussed5. Kretsi (2007) defies the trend by exploring the politics in a different, yet related, 
field: the legal plurality of property rights6.  
There is thus no regard for the core concept of governance in spatial planning: the implementation 
of legislation by national and local institutions. Regarding legislation the new package of spatial 
planning and construction laws adopted from 2012 onwards is not even mentioned at all. The cases 
of Boussauw mentioning the discrepancy between policy and reality in spatial planning documents 
without explaining its causes, and Halimi blaming the lack of success of property restitution 
institutions on politics without highlighting the factors at play, are reflective of the literature’s 
describing of phenomena without discussing the role of politics and governance in solving or 
maintaining the issues faced. This is problematic since local governance faces substantial 
challenges that came with decentralization, while Kosovo has also been repeatedly characterized 
by corruption in the elite. To gain a better understanding of how the spatial planning system 
functioned in Kosovo as part of post-conflict public policy, research on relevant governance and 
the influence of politics will therefore provide new insights. Taking Joireman’s (2016) statement 
into account that Kosovar institutions failed to implement legislation due to UNMIK’s balancing 
of different interests during its governance, an analysis of development of legislation and its 
implementation is even more interesting. 
 
1.3 Research specifications 
The research thus focuses on development of legislation relevant to spatial planning, such as the 
2003 and 2013 Laws on Spatial Planning, and its implementation. At the center of analyzing 
implementation stands whether the relevant institutions on both a national and local level 
implement the legislation successfully, such as the provision of planning documents and obedience 
through the building permit system and inspection. Both the national and local level are analyzed 
given the importance of local governance. This furthermore allows for a more coherent insight into 
                                                          
5 Vöckler discusses reasons for the uncontrolled growth from a post-conflict and even social perspective but does not 
go into specific political processes or the functioning of legislation and institutions, besides mentioning UNMIK 
Regulation 2000/53 and the difficulty of receiving building permits. The failure of plans is touched upon but then only 
the period shortly after the war.  
6 Given the change of regimes and parallel governance structures, a system on hierarchy of ownership rights was to 
be developed in Kosovo. For more information on the implications of property rights see paragraph 4.6. 
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the implications of decentralization policy in Kosovo. The provincial level is not analyzed, since 
there are no provincial governance structures regarding spatial planning.  
Given the stated influence of international actors and occurrence of corruption, the political 
influence at play is given special attention. Regarding international politics, cases similar to the 
choice of decentralization policy in Kosovo for conflict mitigation are identified: events where 
legislation was developed or implemented given a specific interest of the international community 
or international actor. Regarding these actors there is a focus on UNMIK, UN-HABITAT and the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID). While UNMIK was heading the 
international administration after the war, UN-HABITAT was the main international organization 
involved in spatial planning, and USAID has been involved in drafting the new legislation package 
from 2012 onwards. Regarding the local level, the research focuses on the implementation of 
spatial planning policy by governing political parties and occurrence of corruption. Pristina 
functions as a case study because of its uncontrolled growth, economic and political importance, 
and switch of governing political parties in 2014. Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (LDK), one of 
Kosovo’s biggest traditional political parties, held the municipal office from 2000-2013, while 
Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (VV), an upcoming political party which originated from a social 
movement, took over for 2014-2017.  
This corresponds with the total timeframe considered in the research: 1999-2017, which includes 
the immediate post-war situation, UNMIK’s governance, and the years following Kosovo’s 
declared independence in 2008. This period allows for researching governance during and after 
the international administration, to analyze its immediate and lasting impact on spatial planning. 
It also allows for a comparison between the timeframe of LDK’s governance over Pristina and the 
effects of the shift to VV in 2014.  
 
1.4 Methodology and data 
The research uses two methods for methodological triangulation: the use of multiple methods 
within one research to counter shortcomings of one method with another  (Dür, 2008). A case 
study, “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical 
explanations that may be generalizable to other events” (George & Bennett, 2005, p.5) on Kosovo 
and specifically Pristina is used.  Pristina is chosen as a case since it experienced the largest 
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uncontrolled growth in Kosovo as its economic and political center and given the absence of 
academic literature on the capital. The case study functions in both a deductive and inductive 
manner. Deductively, it tests Joireman’s statement that institutions’ failure to implement 
legislation can be attributed to UNMIK’s balancing of interests. Inductively, it aims to identify 
further influence of politics on the development of legislation and its implementation, since 
existing literature does not clarify the specific influence of the political environment. Therefore, 
process tracing is the second method used which aims to identify specific causes to explain the 
unfolding of a chain of events (Ibid). It can be used to assess the applicability of a hypothesis 
within a case by considering “histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other 
sources” (Ibid, p.6). It can also assist in generating new hypotheses by considering “sequences of 
events observed inductively in case studies” (Ibid, p.7). 
The author conducted a total of 40 open and semi-structured interviews with relevant actors in 
Pristina in September 2017. The selected interviewees were current or former urban planners, 
academics, policy makers, and employees of relevant institutions such as municipal directorates, 
ISP, DSP, UN-HABITAT, and USAID. Appendix A provides an overview of organizations 
consulted. Since the interviewees were still employed in the sector at the time of the interview, the 
interviews were generally held on an anonymous basis as many interviewees were not comfortable 
to share information in a referenced manner. The interviews provided the author with a general 
understanding of the development of the spatial planning system which could not be retrieved 
solely from primary and secondary literature. The research uses recurring statements from 
interviews, specific statements from both referenced and anonymous interviewees, primary 
sources, such as the legislation on spatial planning and planning documents, and academic 
literature as secondary sources. Further details on interview references and recurring statements is 
presented in Appendix B. 
 
1.5 Structure of the research 
As specified in the previous paragraphs, the research entails three distinct parts: the legislation, its 
implementation on a national level, and implementation on a local level. Firstly, the development 
of legislation is discussed in Chapter 2 as this sets the policy framework for implementation. 
Within the chapter a distinction is made between the old and new legislation. Chapter 3 considers 
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the implementation on a national level. Chapter 4 focuses on Pristina as a case study with a clear 
distinction between the period LDK and VV governed the capital to identify possible changes 
which occurred given this political transition. 
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2. Development of legislation on spatial planning and relevant fields 
This chapter provides a description of the development of legislation in Kosovo and identifies the 
political interests which determined its characteristics. Not only does the chapter highlight the way 
legislation was used for conflict mitigation, but it also illustrates how another interest, that of 
construction, characterizes a policy shift initiated in 2012.  
 
2.1 The old package (2000-2011) 
When UNMIK took on governance over Kosovo in 1999 the legislation and documents dating 
from the Yugoslav regime were still in place under the provision they were not discriminatory7. 
The first piece of legislation by UNMIK to tackle the uncontrolled growth was a regulation issued 
in September 2000 (UNMIK, 2000) as a reaction to the assassination of the Director of Urbanism 
of Pristina, Rexhep Luci, who took the lead in the fight against illegal construction in the capital 
(European Stability Initiative, 2002), which is further discussed in chapter 4. The regulation 
followed the trend that UNMIK issued legislation in a reactionary manner to unfolding crises 
rather than originating from a strategic vision to take governance forward (Reka, 2003). The 
Assembly of Kosovo could also develop legislation as a Provisional Institution of Self-
Government (PISG) and adopted the Law on Spatial Planning in 2003 and Law on Construction 
in 2004 (Assembly of Kosovo, 2003, 2004). UN-HABITAT assisted the Ministry of Environment 
and Spatial Planning (MESP) in drafting the Law on Spatial Planning which set out the policy 
framework and required planning documents. In 2008 the Law on Spatial Planning was amended 
to support a new Law on Special Protective Zones (SPZ) (Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, 
2008a, 2008b). This was a demand of the international community to protect Serbian cultural and 
religious sites in response to the destruction of Serbian property such as the Orthodox churches in 
riots which occurred in 2004 (Rossi, 2014)8.  
Together these laws can be considered as ‘the old package’, which reflects previously stated 
characteristics of governance in Kosovo: conflict mitigation and decentralization. The former 
                                                          
7 UNMIK regulation 1999/1 (1999b) stated applicability of existing laws, but repealed those considered 
discriminatory. Reka (2003) furthermore provides an insight in the precise legal characteristics of UNMIK regulations. 
8 The SPZs were included in the Ahtisaari Plan. Developed by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and officially 
named the ‘Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement’ (CSP) (Ahtisaari, 2007), the plan included 
policy principles required for the settlement of Kosovo’s status. 
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element is reflected in the demand of the international community for SPZs to protect Serbian 
sites. Decentralization is also present since there was no national standardization legislation on 
construction conditions or demands and guidelines for planning documents for municipalities to 
abide to.  
 
2.2 The new package (2012-2017) 
The old system proved susceptible to corruption and municipalities were struggling to implement 
planning documents given capacity issues and corruption (Boussauw, 2012; Nushi, 2011). 
Especially the process of obtaining a building permit proved difficult. Yet, it wasn’t the 
population’s dissatisfaction which provided the main motive for change. When the World Bank 
published its ‘Doing Business 2012’ report (2012), its results shocked the Kosovar elite as only 
twelve economies in the world scored worse when it came to the ease of receiving building permits 
(Recurring statement interviews #1). Not only is the construction sector important for both the 
formal and informal economy (Strategy & Development Consulting, 2015), the word in Kosovo, 
as echoed throughout the interviews, is that construction firms have close ties with political parties 
(Recurring statement interviews #2). In Prizren there was a clear case of construction firms funding 
an election campaign in return for promised tenders (Jahaj, 2012). Indirect links are also present 
as the brother of the Prime Minister at the time, Hashim Thaçi, heads his own construction firm, 
and profited from the political connection (Olluri, 2013).A new paradigm of laws was to be 
created, but this time not by UN-HABITAT, but through USAID’s running ‘Business Enabling 
Environment Project’ (BEEP) which ran from 2010 to 2013 and would be replaced in 2014 by the 
‘Partnership for Development’ (PFD). Chemonics International, a private development company, 
implemented both projects, which focused on strengthening the private sector (USAID, 2017). The 
old legislation wasn’t amended but new laws were created with one specific core planning concept 
which would change the total spatial planning policy framework: zoning based on the American 
system, in which condition and regulations are homogenous for all parcels within a certain area 
(Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, 2013b). The policy shift was received with mixed reactions. 
A recurring element in the interviews was that there was a lot of criticism from civil society and 
even UN-HABITAT on this change since it provided a different system than the one current 
municipal administrators, planners and project developers were trained in for years. Furthermore, 
it is expected to only give more power to the private sector through the expected outsourcing of 
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drafting planning documents given the already existing capacity issues and lack of knowledge in 
local governance. Yet, the alleged response of the MESP was that they could not refuse since 
USAID, the donor, insisted (Recurring statement interviews #3).   
Within the new system spatial planning serves the purpose of construction as reflected in the 
reasoning behind the new system: not the actual performance of spatial planning led to the change 
in legislation, but the World Bank’s score on ease of receiving building permits. That the new Law 
on Construction was adopted in 2012, before the Law on Spatial Planning in 2013, reflects the 
priority of the government to streamline the construction approach. The zoning system also makes 
it easier to receive building permits and conditions are known beforehand. The Law on 
Construction even includes a provision that if a request for a building permit is not issued in 30 or 
45 days depending on the category, the permit is considered issued (Assembly of the Republic of 
Kosovo, 2013b). Both USAID and UN-HABITAT assisted in developing Administrative 
Instructions (AIs) which lay out further provisions. This took quite some time as the one regarding 
requirements for the zoning maps on municipal level was issued in December 2015, and the one 
regarding the national level was even issued in December 2016. In general, the process did not go 
as smooth as anticipated as it underestimated the challenges that came with drafting legislation in 
a post-conflict setting: a law dealing on legalization of illegal structures was annulled since reality 
did not correspond with the anticipated figures9. An interviewee who worked on part of the new 
legislation stated that every step of the process resembled opening Pandora’s box since it was 
unclear what the actual effects would be (Chemonics interviewee, personal communication, 20 
September, 2017). These laws and AI’s are together part of ‘the new package’ which currently 
defines the policy framework for spatial planning. 
 
2.3 The influence of politics on the development of legislation 
Regarding international politics, the ‘old package’ stemming from 2003 during the time of 
UNMIK’s governance reflects the implications of the decentralization focus of policy in Kosovo 
given the lack of national legislation which would constrain municipal planning documents and 
                                                          
9 The Law for Treatment of Constructions without Permits (Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, 2013a) took 50.000-
100.000 unregistered properties into account which turned out to be over 350.000. There were also other issues since 
property on land registered as public or agricultural could not apply for the procedure. 
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construction conditions. Furthermore, the 2008 amendment and new law on Special Protective 
Zones (SPZs) fit the use of governance for conflict mitigation given the inclusion of SPZs for 
Serbian interests. The new legislation was developed from 2012 onwards under the umbrella of 
USAID’s projects which focused on strengthening the private sector. Even though the change 
occurred in the post-international governance setting, external influence was key for defining 
policy given USAID’s donor leverage. This led to a policy shift with a new zoning system which 
was contested by Kosovar planners and academics. Furthermore, the complexity of developing 
legislation in a post-conflict setting was underestimated by the lawmakers. 
The influence of local politics on legislation originates from the elite’s interest in the construction 
sector and its turn to the US to enhance the building permit process. The motivation for changing 
legislation from the old package to the new does not derive from the actual functioning of spatial 
planning and efficiency of plans, but merely the ease of receiving building permits to ease the 
process of construction. 
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3. Implementation on a national level 
The following chapters focus on the implementation of the legislation discussed in Chapter 2. Both 
chapters identify the political influence on implementation regarding the interests of conflict 
mitigation and construction. The national level is discussed first in this chapter as this sets the stage 
for local governance. The first paragraph focuses on the main national bodies dealing with spatial 
planning while the second paragraph discusses national planning documents. 
 
3.1 Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning (MESP) and relevant bodies 
The MESP, created in 2002 as a PISG (UNMIK, 2002), includes the two main bodies of the central 
government responsible for spatial planning: the Department of Spatial Planning (DSP) and 
Institute of Spatial Planning (ISP), established with the help of UN-HABITAT in 2003 (Nushi, 
2011). The DSP is responsible for drafting and implementing legislation while the ISP’s main task 
is drafting national planning documents and assisting municipalities when requested. The DSP was 
extended into the Department for Spatial Planning, Housing and Construction (DSPHC) in 2014, 
which reflects the bundling of spatial planning and construction in the new package10. The 
Chemonics staff of the running USAID projects is placed directly within the DSPHC to draft the 
new legislation on spatial planning and construction. Since the legislation was already discussed 
in the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on the ISP. 
Luan Nushi (2011), who is the current Director of the ISP, provided an overview of the functioning 
of these two department along with challenges faced: besides the human capacity issues, which 
the MESP generally struggles with (FRIDOM Project, 2010), there was no clear legal division 
between responsibilities of the ISP and DSP regarding, for instance, the monitoring of municipal 
planning documents. An Administrative Instruction has been developed to clear up responsibility 
issues (Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning, 2017). Still, the capacity issues persist11, 
and change requires political will of local politicians. There is, however, not a lot of attention for 
spatial planning in politics and the main reason why was one echoed by all those interviewed: 
                                                          
10 The ISP was briefly moved under the Kosovo Environment Protection Agency (KEPA) and only recently brought 
back to the spatial planning division in 2017. It is not clear why this happened although it seems like all institutions 
in the MESP were placed together regardless of their focus area. 
11 Divided over the three divisions, the DSPHC had 13 staff members while the ISP had 10 on 22 September 2017. 
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politicians do not recognize the importance of spatial planning. A common understanding which 
resonated throughout the interviews was that there was and still is no awareness at the public or 
elite regarding the role of spatial planning for public policy governance of territory (Recurring 
statement interviews #4). This is reflected in the position of the MESP in the government: neither 
LDK or PDK, the two big traditional parties in Kosovo, ever held its office, which was usually 
given to minor parties in the government coalition. In public discourse, the MESP was even often 
referred to as merely ‘the Ministry of Environment’, leaving spatial planning in the abyss. 
Next to drafting national planning documents the ISP reviews municipal plans. Former ISP 
Director Ilir Gjinolli stated he was pressured to approve a plan allowing construction in the 
protected nature area of Sharri Mountains’ in the municipality of Prizren in 2006, which was illegal 
according to the laws in place (personal communication, 22 September, 2017). Shortly after 
Gjinolli resigned, the plan was still approved by the MESP even though relevant legislation, 
including the 2003 Law on Spatial Planning, stated that definite approval of the Assembly was 
required. This case therefore provides a clear example of the influence of corruption on the failure 
of the national government to implement legislation (Republic of Kosovo Ombudsperson 
Institution, 2008). 
 
3.2 National planning documents 
The main influence on local governance regarding implementation of legislation is the content of 
national planning documents. The 2003 Law on Spatial Planning defined the Spatial Plan of 
Kosovo (SPK) as a “strategic multi-sectoral plan” (p.6). As it integrates multiple fields of 
governance and ties it to spatial characteristics of the territory of Kosovo it is often called ‘The 
Second Constitution’ by planners. Municipal planning documents should be created in consistency 
with the content of the SPK. Drafted by the ISP, the first SPK was called ‘Spatial Plan of Kosovo 
2005-2015+’, which was approved in January 2007. This already illustrates the current planning 
discrepancy in Kosovo where planning documents seem to chase reality: there had already been 
almost eight years of uncontrolled growth before a national plan existed. Furthermore, it was 
approved almost four years after the 2003 Law on Spatial Planning was in place. The Law did not 
state a deadline for the SPK, while municipalities already had to draft their planning documents 
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by the end of January 200512. The SPK therefore did not provide guidelines to municipal planning 
documents. While the legislation does not initially show clear signs of the decentralization policy 
besides for the lack of national standardization for building conditions or the drafting of plans, it 
is more visible in the implementation given the lack of influence the SPK has on municipal 
planning documents drafted by municipalities. Furthermore, the interviews also showed that 
planners functional on a local level did not find the SPK detailed enough to provide clear guidance 
for municipal planning documents (Recurring statement interviews #5). When it comes to the 
specific content of the plans, planners who worked on the SPK mentioned that the plan was not 
influenced through corruption by local politicians. The transparency achieved through assistance 
of international actors gave no room to influence the plan (Recurring statement interviews #6)13. 
Besides, politicians generally do not see the power of the national planning documents as political 
tools (Recurring statement interviews #7). 
The same counts for the second national plan ‘Spatial Plan of Kosova: 2010-2020+’, which was 
mainly a revision of the first one, approved in July 2010, although two differences can be noted 
when it comes to influence of politics. The Ministry of Transport provided two alternative routes 
for a part of the highway from Pristina to Tirana for the claimed reason it would prevent corruption. 
International politics also made its way into the second plan. The 2009 draft version did not include 
the Special Protective Zones (SPZs) which the international community wanted to be included for 
protection of Serbian Orthodox Church sites. They weren’t part of the plan because information 
was lacking since there was no existing legislation on the SPZs. After the Law on SPZs (Assembly 
of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008b) was approved, they were included in the plan which was then 
immediately approved. Even though this occurred after Kosovo declared its independence in 2008, 
the leverage of the international community was still rather high, since the independence was 
supervised until 2012 by the International Civilian Representative for Kosovo (ICR) which 
ensured that the provisions of the Ahtisaari package were implemented (European Commission, 
2008)14.  
                                                          
12 In practice, most municipalities failed to develop planning documents before the deadline. 
13 UN-HABITAT and the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies from the Netherlands both assisted 
in drafting the national plan (Nushi, 2011). 
14 See footnote 9 for more information on the Ahtisaari plan. The ICR was simultaneously the European Union Special 
Representative (EUSR). Van Willigen discusses how this political influence of the EU influence would likely hamper 
the creation of “domestically embedded political institutions” (2009, p.242). 
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The only substantial, yet important, change the 2013 Law on Spatial Planning brought regarding 
national planning documents was that the ISP has to develop a Zoning Map of Kosovo next to the 
SPK and the SPZ. Implementation has not yet started, because the ISP currently waits for 
municipalities to draft their Municipal Zoning Maps (MZM) first, therefore providing no example 
in developing Zoning Maps.  This again illustrates the decentralization principle and reflects the 
process of the first SPK which also did not provide guidance or set restrictions for municipal 
documents. 
 
3.3 The influence of politics on implementation of legislation on a national level 
There is one case in which international politics directly influenced the implementation of 
legislation on a national level. Alike to the findings on legislation it has to do with the protection 
of Serbian interests in Kosovo as the approval of the SPK was delayed until the SPZs were 
included. Indirectly, the decentralization principle came into play as the national planning 
documents were not detailed enough, nor were created on time, to provide clear policy provisions 
for municipal planning documents. The SPZs therefore stands out, since here the national 
provisions do clearly limit the possibilities for municipal planning. The decentralized nature of 
policy is therefore broken to protect Serbian interests. 
Regarding the influence of local politics, it appears that there is not a lot of attention for spatial 
planning on a national level as its importance for governance is not recognized. Therefore, the only 
incident found had to do with corruption in the ‘Sharri’ case to allow denser construction. This 
illustrates how spatial planning suffered from the interest of construction. 
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4. Implementation on a local level: the case of Pristina 
Whereas the previous chapters considered the legislation and its implementation on a national 
level, this chapter focuses on the implementation on the local level with Pristina as a case study. 
The implementation of legislation on a municipal level has two main components. Firstly, the 
building permit system and inspection are analyzed since these bridge the content of spatial 
planning documents and legislation to actual on-the-ground development. The spatial planning 
documents are regarded in separate paragraphs as these set the guidelines or restrictions for 
development which the building permit system and inspection should abide to. A distinction is 
made in the timeframe LDK and VV held the municipal office to allow for comparisons. After an 
evaluative paragraph summarizes the influence of politics, an additional paragraph links the 
difficulties faced on a local level to the wider implications of Kosovo’s unresolved status. 
 
4.1 Local governance of Pristina under LDK (2000-2013) 
LDK is a political party created by Albanian intellectuals in December 1989 which non-violently 
fought for Kosovo’s independence as a reaction to the discriminatory policy of Milosevic in 
Kosovo (Wolfgram, 2008). In the Albanian organized parliamentary 1992 elections the party won 
by huge numbers (Francis, 2002) and provided the president of the parallel Albanian government, 
Ibrahim Rugova, who would remain in this function during UNMIK’s administration until he died 
while holding office in 2006. From 1989-1999 LDK set up parallel structures including education, 
health care, and even an own tax system throughout Kosovo (van der Borgh, 2012). 
Just as in the rest of Kosovo, the existing non-discriminatory laws and plans were still in place in 
Pristina right after the war. They were, however, not enforced which led to uncontrolled expansion 
while a huge influx of money from the international community and diaspora was put into 
reconstruction. Houses were built on land designated for agriculture and existing buildings were 
extended towards the street for commercial purposes or even had extra floors added on top for 
housing (Vöckler, 2009). Spatial planning did not function as there was no policy abided in the 
first years of reconstruction after the war. UNMIK never seemed to care too much about the 
uncontrolled growth, especially in the beginning since it considered housing and employment 
favorable. While already a controversial topic, the assassination of Director of Urbanism Rexhep 
Luci in 2000 and the following lack of a condemning voice of the international community and 
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local politicians then silenced criticism for years to come (Recurring statement interviews #8). The 
legal system followed this trend as UNMIK never tackled illegal construction15. Pristina provided 
its first post-war planning document in July 2004 and the building permit system wasn’t even  in 
place until 2005 (Ibid).  
While the MESP falls to the background in national politics, the Directorate of Urbanism is one of 
the most important bodies in local governance given its role in issuing building permits (Assembly 
of Kosovo, 2003). The Directorate of Inspection’s mandate covered the issuing of technical 
approvals and utility permits (Assembly of Kosovo, 2004). The issuing of these documents was 
very susceptible to corruption given the lack of transparency. Multiple interviewees mentioned 
alleged cases where one building permit was used for two buildings’ technical approval. 
Constructing more floors than the building permit allowed and then bribing the inspection was 
another scheme that was used (Recurring statement interviews #9). UN-HABITAT’s MuSPP, 
which assisted municipal directorates in developing and implementing their planning documents 
(UN-HABITAT Kosovo, n.d.-a, n.d.-b, n.d.-c), ran from 2005 until 2014, but Pristina wasn’t part 
of the program during any part of the project. In none of the interviews it became clear why Pristina 
did not participate. A former UN-HABITAT planner mentioned how Pristina generally never 
wanted to cooperate and was hesitant to engage with international partners (personal 
communication, 23 September, 2017). The ‘why’ remains rather unclear but multiple interviewees 
believed that the transparency on the functioning of the municipality was undesired by politicians 
in power at the time (Recurring statement interviews #10). Progress was made during the LDK 
mandate, but it went rather slow and until 2010 it was considered strange to even apply for a 
building permit at all. This change probably occurred due to municipal elections at the time. How 
many permits were issues around the time of the election could not be researched since a lot of 
documents are missing in the archive (A. Rexhepi, personal communication, 27 September, 2017). 
Taking the precedent Prizren case of election promises into account along with the alleged ties 
between the construction sector and political parties, it seems likely this was a pledge of LDK for 
the support it received from construction firms for their electoral campaign.  
During the LDK mandate there was frequent occurrence of corruption in spatial planning when it 
comes to the building permit system and inspection. Whether these malfunctions can be blamed 
                                                          
15 The same counts for the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). 
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on LDK’s party politics rather than individuals aiming to improve personal wealth cannot be stated 
through the retrieved information. What is worrisome, however, is that LDK never really tried to 
change the dysfunctional system just like UNMIK, except for the building permit system which 
even didn’t really start functioning before 2010, even though it was in place since 2005. Dukagjin 
Hasimja, Head of the Urban Planning Department at the University of Pristina, described the 
phenomenon with the Albanian proverb “the wolf loves the fog” (personal communication, 4 
September, 2017), implying a dysfunctional system was purposefully kept in place to be misused.  
 
4.2 Municipal planning documents from 2000-2013 
Municipal plans are considered to be quite different from national plans since they are more 
detailed, tangible and allow for short-term results (Recurring statement interviews #11). The first 
plan of Pristina was the ‘2020 Strategic Plan for the urban development of Pristina’. The plan 
started a chain development which caused discrepancy in planning documents. Besides the 
“misleading vision” (European Stability Initiative, p.4) the document contained, it didn’t fit the 
requirements stated by the 2003 Law on Spatial Planning as it was neither a real Municipal 
Development Plan (MDP) or Urban Development Plan (UDP) (HIDROING-DK, Urbanistica, & 
Ekonerg, 2013). The Strategic Plan being neither a MDP or UDP, was still used as a basis for the 
Urban Regulatory Plans (URP), which are more detailed. This meant that a solid basis for 
developing URPs was lacking. On top of that the URPs were not developed by the municipality, 
but were outsourced through tenders to different firms. From 2004 until 2013 URPs were 
developed on this basis which were often not consistent with one another due to the absence of a 
national framework, as discussed in Chapter 2. This illustrates the negative effects the 
decentralization policy had on a local level. According to most of the spatial planners interviewed 
this is the main reason for discrepancies between planning documents which prevented harmony 
in spatial planning between and within municipalities (Recurring statement interviews #12).  A 
“new” UDP and MDP were developed and approved in 2013, but 19 URPs were already in place 
at the time of which some did not correspond with these new planning documents. This chain of 
developments led not only to discrepancies with reality, but also between planning documents. 
During interviews with planners and staff of the Directorate of Urbanism it was echoed that this 
provided great difficulties for issuing building permits as implementing one document could 
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sometimes be illegal considering another document (Former employees Directorate of Urbanism, 
personal communication, 20 September, 2017). 
While municipal planning documents should serve to guide development, it is not the strategic 
vision that is the biggest influence of planning documents in practice, but the density of 
construction allowed in a certain area. The denser the construction allowed, the more valuable the 
land is. A couple of months before the 2013 elections were held, the new UDP and MDP for 
Pristina were approved along with three URPs for an area signified for allowing high density of 
construction in ‘New Pristina’ (Komuna e Prishtinës, n.d.-a, n.d.-b). An interviewee who worked 
on one of the documents stated there was pressure by politicians to allow high density construction 
in this area (Manager, personal communication, September 2017). The interviewee also mentioned 
that there was continuous pressure for quick finalization of the plan as they wanted it approved 
before the 2013 municipal elections. 
Another mechanism through which politics impacted spatial planning is through changing the 
designation of an area through the Municipal Assembly. The case of Road B (‘Ruga B’) stands 
out, which was initially designated as a transport corridor but actually became Pristina’s second 
city center due to the density of buildings in the area. The Municipal Assembly even changed the 
URP and allowed smaller roads and construction on land reserved for green area (Komuna e 
Prishtinës, 2010, 2011). 
The planning documents drafted during LDK governance were thus hampered in their strategic 
vision given a focus on density of construction. This occurred both through corruption as 
politicians influenced plans, but also through the Municipal Assembly. For both cases one cannot 
attribute this to LDK politics, but it is remarkable that the second case occurred via an institution 
of local governance. Furthermore, as previously stated, the decentralized policy system paved way 
for discrepancies to occur between planning documents. 
 
4.3 Local governance of Pristina under VV (2014-2017) 
Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (VV), ‘self-determination movement’ in Albanian, is a political party 
created in 2005 which was previously characterized by protests and political opposition with “a 
mixed nationalist - radical left agenda” (Këlliçi & Danaj, 2017, p.11). Originating from a social 
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movement which contested the democratic nature of international supervision and its institutions, 
it resisted “the alienation of politics” (Vardari-Kesler, 2012, p.173) between governance in Kosovo 
and its citizens, and proclaimed the importance of “collective action” (Ibid). VV winning Pristina’s 
municipal elections with Shpend Ahmeti as the new mayor was conceived as a surprise victory 
(UNMIK Division of Public Information, 2013). After years of LDK governance, VV won the 
local elections but did not have the majority in the Municipal Assembly. Still, VV was now 
governing itself, rather than being only opposition. 
VV stepped into the spotlight by taking on the fight against illegal construction in 2014, which 
was considered as a bold move especially given the assassination of Rexhep Luci in 2000. 
Construction throughout Pristina was stopped for six months which triggered protest and threats 
(Fazliu, 2014). Mayor Shpend Ahmeti even received international attention for his mission to end 
illegal construction (Borger, 2014), which VV claims to have stopped completely. The crackdown 
on illegal construction can be considered as a political statement to show Pristina’s citizens they 
could do the unimaginable.  
While some considered them scared to be decision makers in the beginning, VV initially 
reorganized some of the Directorates, and Liburn Aliu, former Director of Urbanism, mentioned 
they first wanted to get a grip on things and understand how the directorates were functioning 
(personal communication, 23 September, 2017). Especially the Directorates on Inspection and 
Urbanism received special attention. Inspectors of zones were re-shuffled and ten previous 
inspectors were suspended during further investigation on possible previous illegal actions. The 
information provision system also received special attention given the increase in requests for 
building permits after the halt of illegal construction and 45-day response limit stated by the 2012 
Law on Construction. The ‘Permit Tracking System’ and ‘Published Permits’ (Komuna e 
Prishtinës, n.d.-c), which provide information on the building permit procedure and an overview 
of permits issued from 2012 onwards, even received the USAID Transparency Award. The issuing 
of building permits was also to be done through a team, rather than on an individual basis, to 
enhance transparency. Organizational changes regarding Directorates, for which the mayor needs 
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no consent of the Assembly, were made as well during the mandate under the motto of improving 
efficiency16.  
The fight against illegal construction and the focus of VV on the functionality of departments has 
a political reasoning as well. First of all, VV did not need the consent of the Municipal Assembly 
for these actions. Bringing the urban planning sector to order was one of Shpend Ahmeti’s 
priorities in the twelve-point plan used for the election campaign (Lëvizja Vetëvendosje, 2013). 
Besides, as a relatively new and growing political party, they needed to show they could govern, 
while facing the same capacity and budget issues as LDK17. Multiple interviewees stated that in 
the Directorate of Urbanism some municipal administrators affiliated to LDK stopped working 
and formed blockades, but it did not hamper its overall functioning (Recurring statement 
interviews #13). VV couldn’t count on support from the central government as LDK and PDK ran 
the coalition together with previous LDK Mayor of Pristina Isa Mustafa as Prime Minister. There 
was even a stand-off between VV and LDK Minister of Finance, Avdullah Hoti, which is reflective 
of blocking politics between parties at a central and local level. The European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) required a state guarantee before providing a loan to 
finance busses as part of the Sustainable Urban Mobility Plan (European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, n.d.), but the Minister also wanted a guarantee from the Municipal Assembly 
(Bota Sot, 2016), in which LDK had the majority.   
 
4.4 Planning documents from 2014-2017 
When VV came to power in Pristina in 2014, the new UDP and MDP were just approved, so no 
new ones were developed during its mandate. They would have also needed approval of the 
Municipal Assembly. The 2013 Law on Spatial Planning of the new package was already in place 
at the time, which requires a new Municipal Zoning Map (MZM), but the relevant AI was not 
available until the end of 2015, already making it impossible for Pristina to create one within the 
                                                          
16 While the Spatial Planning department was previously in the Directorate of Urbanism, it became part of the 
Directorate of Strategic Planning and Sustainable Development. The Directorate of Local Infrastructure was 
transformed into the Directorates for Capital Investments and Contracts Management, and separate Directorates for 
Agriculture and Property were also created. 
17 While decentralization is a core concept in Kosovo’s public governance, there is a centralized fiscal system in which 
the Ministry of Local Governance and Ministry of Finance set the limits for staff and budget of municipalities besides 
self-created municipal revenue such as property taxes.  
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fifteen-month deadline. This is again an example of how the legislation in Kosovo is not 
implemented. At the end of 2017, the tender for developing the MZM was still being prepared 
without national guidance. 
 
4.5 The influence of politics on spatial planning in Pristina 
International politics had its influence on spatial planning in Pristina. The interests of UNMIK in 
employment and housing led to a laissez-faire approach towards the construction sector. Illegal 
construction therefore became the status-quo and UNMIK never tried to tackle or change this as it 
was more occupied with stability and security and the status issue of Kosovo. The decentralization 
system set in place by the international community also indirectly paved way for discrepancies 
between planning documents. A lack of standardization or regularization on a central level let 
municipalities go about their own business, which in the case of Pristina even led to a situation 
where actions taken with the provisions of one document can even be illegal given another. This 
also damages the strategic character plans are supposed to have for the development of Pristina. 
Local politics are also at play, which provides a contrast to the findings on the national 
implementation. During LDK’s mandate from 2000 to 2013 spatial planning was mainly used as 
an instrument for construction rather than for its strategic implications for governance. In practice, 
it is therefore the density of construction which has the most influence of planning documents. 
Corruption in the building permit system and inspection was not really tackled given the personal 
wealth to be made by politicians and suspected ties between political parties and construction 
sector. Furthermore, Pristina was regarded to be a LDK stronghold which meant it was less 
motivated to win votes through good governance. The surprise victory of VV provided it a first 
break from opposition from 2014 onwards which led to a change to the implementation of spatial 
planning. The effectiveness of the building permit system and inspection was increased and illegal 
construction was allegedly halted completely. That VV used the functioning of the municipal 
Directorates to show the citizens of Kosovo that it could govern created an enhancement of public 
governance which breaks the previous trend of dysfunctional spatial planning set in place during 
UNMIK’s administration. However beneficial this change may seem, the implementation of 
spatial planning is inherently limited given reasons implicitly present in the Pristina case. The next 
paragraph will therefore explicitly focus on further core issues damaging spatial planning. 
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4.6 The on-the-ground implications of Kosovo’s unresolved status 
The case of LDK politicians’ reluctance to change a corrupt system stems from individual profit 
to be made through informal networks. Certain politicians belonging to the elite own a lot of land 
in and around Pristina which means there is a lot of money to be made in the land market. Yet, 
ownership in Kosovo is a complicated manner as one might expect given its history. The 
discriminatory Serbian legislation against Albanians from 1989 to 1999 led to informal 
transactions on housing and land which created competing claims on property rights after the war 
(Kretsi, 2007). This limits the enforcement of policy regardless of its precise content of policy for 
two reasons. Firstly, there is a discrepancy between practical ownership on the ground and legal 
ownership. Secondly, the legal ownership of land itself is often not clear. This did not only come 
to be given the illegal construction and conflicting property rights, but also due to often missing 
information on ownership. Both conflicting property rights and missing information relate to the 
biggest question regarding Kosovo’s governance: its status. The unresolved status of Kosovo 
entails unresolved ownership which comes with uncertainty. This uncertainty on a national level 
trickles down to local governance where absence of information on ownership inherently entails a 
discrepancy between planning and reality because it is not even clear what ‘reality’ is in the first 
place. Practiced informal ownership and actual formal legal ownership are often different and the 
latter is often not even clear itself given competing claims and missing information. This 
phenomenon showcases itself in the Cadaster which includes information on property rights. 
Kosovo’s Cadaster data of the 90s was either destroyed or taken to Belgrade  (Cordial & 
Rosandhaug, 2009), and even though the 2013 Brussels Agreement between Kosovo and Serbia 
states the latter would deliver this information, this has still not been transferred (Group for Legal 
and Political Studies, 2014). The current Cadaster was built from scratch using pre-war maps and 
includes post-war development, but a lot of information is still missing (Directorate of Cadaster 
employee, personal communication, 28 September, 2017). This illustrates how Kosovo’s 
unresolved status limits its governance as the absence of information contributed to lack of 
enforcement and increased corruption.  
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5. Conclusion 
Governance in Kosovo has proven to be challenging since the war ended in 1999 as UNMIK failed 
to create sustainable institutions during its administration from 1999 to 2008. Kosovo’s public 
policy still faces substantial issues as institutions fail to implement relevant legislation which is 
partly to blame on international politics and UNMIK’s administration’s balancing of interests. This 
research focuses on spatial planning as a part of governance in Kosovo for two reasons: to assess 
its role in coordinating policies for strategic governance of territory, and to identify the 
implications of Kosovo’s unresolved status. The findings resonate with Joireman’s statement that 
governance in Kosovo suffered from the balancing of interests. Firstly, the international 
community used spatial planning as a conflict mitigation tool given the Serbian minorities present 
in Kosovo through a decentralized system which gives more power to municipalities, while there 
is a centralized focus on protection of Serbian property. Secondly, (the lack of) spatial planning 
served to facilitate construction. International politics’ focus on security, stability and post-war 
rebuilding and employment, led to an uncontrolled construction sector which gained an important 
foothold in the formal and informal economy while having alleged ties with political parties. 
Furthermore, the main practical use of spatial planning policy was the density of construction 
allowed. This allowed the elite to enhance personal wealth through the rise of property value. The 
role of spatial planning for facilitating construction is reflected in development of legislation as a 
policy switch initiated in 2012 due to donor leverage of USAID instigated a new zoning system 
which is expected to give more power to the private sector. Finally, the balancing of interests 
portrays itself in the implications the unresolved status of Kosovo brings. The formal and informal 
grey areas regarding property rights and authority created uncertainty and therefore provided a 
fruitful environment for corruption.  
Within these trends, national and local institutions struggled to implement legislation as capacity 
issues and corruption set the tone. Furthermore, the decentralized system entailed a lack of 
guidance regarding policy and standardization from a national level. In the case of Pristina, this 
led to a dysfunctional building permit system and inspection, while even planning documents were 
influenced to allow high density. Local politics provided a positive change in 2014 when VV won 
the municipal election in Pristina through a surprise victory over LDK which had held its office 
since 2000. VV tackled illegal construction and improved the building permit system to show its 
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voters it could govern in its first break from being an opposition party. This enhanced the 
implementation of spatial planning as public policy which broke the trend of corruption and non-
transparency set in place during the time of UNMIK’s governance. 
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Appendix A: Interviews overview 
During the month of September, 2017, the author conducted 40 semi-structured and open 
interviews to gain a better understanding on the functioning of the spatial planning system and the 
political processes at play in the developments. Those interviewed were employed by the following 
organizations during or before the time of the interview. 
 
International organizations 
• EU Office 
• IMF 
• OSCE 
• SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency) 
• UN-HABITAT  
• UNMIK 
• USAID 
 
Central government 
• MESP –DSP/DSPHC 
• MESP – ISP 
 
Local government 
• Municipality of Pristina – Directorate of Urbanism 
• Municipality of Pristina – Directorate of Cadaster 
• Municipality of Pristina – Directorate of Capital Investment & Contract Management 
• Municipality of Pristina – Directorate of Inspection 
• Municipality of Pristina – Directorate of Property 
• Municipality of Pristina – Directorate of Public Services 
• Municipality of Pristina – Directorate of Strategic Planning 
 
NGOs 
• Archis Intervention  
• Chemonics 
• Cultural Heritage without Borders 
• EC Ma Ndryshe  
• European Center for Minority Issues 
• Internews 
• Kosovo Association of Architects 
• për Prishtinën  
• ProPlanning Institute 
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• UrbanPlus 
 
Academic sector 
• Staff of University of Pristina Urban Planning Department 
• Students of the Architecture Master of University of Pristina 
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Appendix B: Referenced interviews  
Identifiable sources in order of referencing 
Interviewee Dr. Ilir Gjinolli 
Relevant experience March 2002 - October 2003 Political Adviser to the Minister of 
Environment and Spatial Planning 
October 2003 - October 2006 - Founder and Director of the Institute for 
Spatial Planning 
Date of interview 22 September 2017 
Content interview During the interview, which lasted an hour, Gjinolli’s experiences as 
Director of the ISP were discussed along with the challenges Kosovo 
faces in the field of spatial planning and the role of politics. In the 
presented research the interview is used to illustrate the influence of 
politicians on spatial planning documents to allow a higher density of 
construction. 
 
Interviewee Albion Rexhepi 
Relevant experience 2014 – present (2017) Legal and Political Adviser in the Directorate of 
Urbanism of the Municipality of Pristina 
Date of interview 27 September 2017 
Content interview During the interview, which lasted over an hour, Rexhepi’s experiences 
in the Directorate of Urbanism were discussed with special attention to 
the changes made within the Directorate and the now publicly available 
information regarding the building permit system in Pristina (‘Permit 
Tracking System’ and ‘Published Permits’). In the presented research the 
interview is used to reference the lack of information on building permits 
issued since documents are missing from the municipality’s archive. 
 
Interviewee Dr. Dukagjin Hasimja 
Relevant experience 2000 – present (2017) Head of Chair of Urban Design and Spatial 
Planning on Department of Architecture at University of Pristina 
Date of interview 4 September 2017 
Content interview During the interview, which lasted over an hour, the challenges Kosovo 
faces in spatial planning were discussed along with the influence of 
political parties and the international community. The interview was 
referenced for the proverb “the wolf likes the fog” implying LDK 
politicians never really tried to change the system cause its 
dysfunctionality created room for corruption.  
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Interviewee Liburn Aliu 
Relevant experience 2013 – 2017 Director of Directorate of Urbanism of the Municipality of 
Pristina 
Date of interview 23 September 2017 
Content interview During the interview, which lasted almost an hour, the functioning of the 
Directorate of Urbanism was discussed with a focus on the changes made 
by VV since 2014 including the crackdown. The interview was used in 
the research to discuss the strategy of VV at the Directorates in its first 
year of governance in Pristina. 
 
Anonymous references in order of referencing 
Interviewee Chemonics interviewee 
Date of interview 20 September 2017 
Content interview During the interview, which lasted almost an hour in a restaurant in 
Pristina, the process which led to the new legislation was discussed along 
with the actual drafting of legislation. The strengths and opportunities of 
the new law were mainly discussed but the interviewee also mentioned 
the difficulties at play regarding the Law on Treatment of Constructions 
without Permits which was used as a reference in this research. 
Motivation for use 
of anonymous 
source 
The predicted numbers of unregistered property and actual numbers were 
echoed by other interviewees. That the law was later revoked also adds 
to the statement that during drafting of the law they did not know well 
how its actual implementation would unfold. 
 
Interviewee Former UN-HABITAT planner 
Date of interview 23 September 2017 
Content interview During the interview, which lasted over an hour in a restaurant in Pristina, 
the spatial planning system of Kosovo was discussed with a focus on the 
role of UN-HABITAT. Pristina’s urban development was also discussed. 
The interview is referenced for the statement regarding the absence of 
Pristina in the MuSPP program which the interviewee believed to be 
given the transparency this would bring in the functioning of the 
Directorates. 
Motivation for use 
of anonymous 
source 
Pristina did not take part in the MuSPP and even though the author asked 
multiple interviewees no one knew the reason why. Given the corruption 
in the departments and absence of public attention on the functioning of 
spatial planning this seems like a plausible reason even though it cannot 
be stated with certainty. 
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Interviewee Former employees Directorate of Urbanism 
Date of interview 20 September 2017 
Content interview During the interview, which lasted almost an hour in a restaurant in 
Pristina, the functioning of Pristina’s Directorate of Urbanism was 
discussed with a focus on the changes made when VV took over in 2014.  
Motivation for use 
of anonymous 
source 
When checked with other planners and academics, the statement was 
always echoed. Given the lack of standardization and the unsuitable basis 
for planning documents in Pristina the first Strategic Plan brought, the 
statement of inconsistency between documents is used in this research. 
 
Interviewee Manager who worked on one of the 2013 planning documents 
Date of interview 27 September 2017 
Content interview During the interview, which lasted almost an hour in a restaurant in 
Pristina, the different planning documents for Pristina were discussed 
with a special focus on the 2013 UDP, MDP and URPs on New Prishtina. 
The interview was referenced for the manager’s mentioning of receiving 
influence from politicians to allow dense construction in certain areas. It 
was also used for the pressure of politicians to finish the plans on a very 
short-term basis. The interviewee believed the motivation for this 
pressure was that they owned land in this area while the stress on quick 
finalization was due to the at-the-time upcoming local elections. 
Motivation for use 
of anonymous 
source 
 
The statements made fits within the trend that spatial planning is used to 
allow dense construction and it resembles the mentioned case of the 
illegal construction in ‘Sharri Mountains’ were the Minister exerted 
pressure on Gjinolli to approve a URP. That there was pressure to finish 
the documents in a relatively short time also fits the time frame of the 
local elections and the Municipal Assembly’s approval of the documents. 
 
Interviewee Directorate of Cadaster employees 
Date of interview 28 September 2017 
Content interview During the interview, which lasted almost an hour at the Directorate, the 
creation and functioning of the Cadaster was discussed along with 
challenges faced. The statements that the Cadaster was built from scratch 
using pre-war maps, and that it still misses a lot of information was used. 
Motivation for use 
of anonymous 
source 
Since the Cadaster data from the 90s is still present in Belgrade, it comes 
as no surprise that a lot of the information is still missing. Narang and 
Reutersward (2006) already state that the Cadaster was built from scratch 
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but from the interview it became clear that pre-war maps were used as a 
basis. 
 
Recurring statements 
Recurring statement interviews #1 
Statement The bad results of Kosovo in the 2012 World Bank Doing Business 
Report on ease of receiving building permits provided the main reason 
to change the policy regarding spatial planning and construction. 
Motivation for use 
of statement 
While no high-level policy makers of the government or USAID were 
interviewed, the statement was made by every interviewee. Planners, 
academics, local politicians in Pristina, and practitioners working on 
the new legislation, all echoed the statement. It seems therefore to be 
the common conception on how the process of the policy switch 
started. Furthermore, it seems plausible given the timeframe in which 
the report was published which was months before the 2012 Law on 
Construction was approved. Lastly, the suspected ties between politics 
and the construction sector (see recurring statement #2) make the 
statement seem even more valid. 
 
Recurring statement interviews #2 
Statement Construction firms have close ties with political parties. 
Motivation for use 
of statement 
A recurring statement in the interviews was that construction firms 
have close ties with political parties. The construction sector has been 
important for Kosovo’s formal and informal economy and it is clear 
that a lot of it occurred illegally. The lack of public outcry from 
politicians after the assassination of Rexhep Luci, the family-ties 
between politics and construction firms, and the Prizren case of 
pledged tenders in return for campaign money, further support the 
claim. Therefore, it has been used in the research as a recurring 
statement. 
 
Recurring statement interviews #3 
Statement USAID pushed for the new zoning system. 
Motivation for use 
of statement 
Interviews with (former) planners from UN-HABITAT, NGOs and 
(former) staff of the municipal directorate of Urbanism all highlighted 
that the zoning system was an idea strongly pursued for by Chemonics 
and USAID, even though the policy shift was met with opposition. The 
48 
 
interviewees also mentioned that the MESP was reluctant to oppose 
the idea itself given the donor relationship with USAID. Furthermore, 
a (former) staff member of Chemonics admitted that USAID was 
really set on implementing the new system. 
 
Recurring statement interviews #4 
Statement There is a lack of awareness at the public and elite in Kosovo regarding 
the importance of spatial planning for public policy. 
Motivation for use 
of statement 
It was a common statement made by practitioners and academics in 
Kosovo that the public and elite do not recognize the governance 
implications of spatial planning. They only regard planning 
documents, building permit system and inspection for construction. 
This reflects the overall findings of the research that spatial planning 
is used for construction and is an often-neglected field itself. 
 
Recurring statement interviews #5 
Statement The SPK is not detailed enough to provide clear guidance for 
municipal planning documents. 
Motivation for use 
of statement 
Multiple planners active on the local level claimed that the national 
SPK lacks specifics to specifically guide the creation of municipal 
planning documents. Mainly the inter-city transport corridors of the 
SPK made their way into municipal planning documents. The 
statement is used in the research as the SPK indeed does not provide 
very detailed information. Furthermore, it fits the decentralized 
characteristic of spatial planning. 
 
Recurring statement interviews #6 
Statement The presence of international actors prevented corruption influencing 
the plan. 
Motivation for use 
of statement 
Planners who worked on the first SPK mentioned that the presence of 
UN-HABITAT and IHS in the drafting process prevented politicians 
from influencing the plan. When one also takes into account that 
corruption of plans on a local level is more attractive given the short-
term results and lack of transparency, the statement seems even more 
valid. 
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Recurring statement interviews #7 
Statement Politicians do not recognize the importance of spatial planning 
documents as policy tools. 
Motivation for use 
of statement 
Academics and planners on a national and local level interviewed 
echoed the statement that politicians do not recognize the importance 
of planning documents for governance. This is reflected in the lack of 
attention for spatial planning in politics. It also fits the phenomenon 
that spatial planning documents are only considered important given 
their role in setting the density for allowed construction. 
 
Recurring statement interviews #8 
Statement Lack of condemnation by politicians and the international community 
regarding the assassination of Rexhep Luci silenced criticism for years 
to come. 
Motivation for use 
of statement 
Rexhep Luci was allegedly murdered due to the measures he planned 
on taking to stop illegal construction. Even though planners and 
academics where frustrated of the situation and aware of its negative 
implications for spatial planning, there was a general tendency to not 
take up an active fight against illegal construction. Due to the lack of 
condemnation the informal rule seemed to be that those who criticized 
would not be protected and therefore might suffer the same fate as 
Rexhep Luci. This enforced the sustaining character of the corruption 
present in the sector.  Most of the interviewees echoed this statement 
while none disagreed. 
 
Recurring statement interviews #9 
Statement Corruption in the building permit and inspection scheme led to 
situations where one permit was used for two buildings, or the actual 
construction did not meet the requirements set in the permit. 
Motivation for use 
of statement 
Administrators of the Municipal Directorates of Urbanism and 
Inspection mentioned these occurrences of corruption before VV 
allegedly cracked down on illegal construction. Planners and 
academics echoed the statement which adds to its validity.  
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Recurring statement interviews #10 
Statement Politicians in Pristina during LDK’s governance did not want to 
participate in programs with international donors as this would 
increase transparency. 
Motivation for use 
of statement 
As mentioned in the research, it is not clear what the exact reason was 
that Pristina did not participate in the MuSPP. None of the 
interviewees knew the exact reason, but they all suspected it to be 
because of this statement. This reflects the references of anonymous 
UN-HABITAT planner and academic Dukagjin Hasimja. When also 
taking the presence of corruption in the government sector into 
account it seems quite likely that this was indeed the reason. 
 
Recurring statement interviews #11 
Statement Municipal planning documents are interpreted differently by 
politicians as they seem to have more short-term tangible results and 
their drafting process is less transparent. 
Motivation for use 
of statement 
Academics and planners on a national and local level echoed this 
statement. Especially in contrast to the more generic national plans, 
the municipal plans are very detailed and, most importantly, state the 
conditions for construction such as the density allowed. Given the 
illustrated misuse of spatial planning for construction the statement 
seems very likely to be true. Furthermore, processes on a municipal 
level are not that transparent given the lack of control from the national 
government. 
 
Recurring statement interviews #12 
Statement The absence of a national framework for standards on construction 
conditions and the drafting of planning documents caused the 
discrepancy between documents. 
Motivation for use 
of statement 
Academics and planners functional on a local level all echoed this 
statement. Since the municipal documents were drafted by different 
firms without having proper guidelines or restrictions created big 
differences between the plans. This statement corresponds with the 
notions made in recurring statement #5. 
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Recurring statement interviews #13 
Statement When VV took over governance of Pristina, there were blockades 
within Directorates by LDK affiliated staff members. 
Motivation for use 
of statement 
The statement was made by local policy makers, academics, and local 
planners. Given budgetary restrictions it is apparently rather difficult 
to fire old staff and hire new, but this was not specifically researched. 
While the author did not speak with any personnel which allegedly 
was part of such a blockade the statement still appears valid since it 
was echoed by multiple interviewees including (former) employees of 
the Directorates. 
 
